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Investment Companies as Guardian
Shareholders: The Place of the MSIC in
the Corporate Governance Debate
Ronald J. Gilson*
and Reinier Kraakman**
Comparative corporate governance is both necessary and hard. Recent
scholarship has identified the political and historical contingency of the
American pattern of corporate governance. The Berle-Means corporation,'
with its separation of management and risk bearing and the attendant
agency conflict between managers and shareholders, is now widely recog-
nized as being as much a creature of the American pattern of law and poli-
tics as the handiwork of neutral market forces.2 This recognition
underscores the need to place the American experience in a comparative
perspective. Other patterns of corporate governance can provide both in-
sights into the operation of our own and a source of potential reforms; orga-
nizational techniques that have worked elsewhere may be transportable.
Nevertheless, the very insight that recommends a comparative perspective
also indicates the difficulty of the undertaking. It is not only the American
pattern of corporate governance that is contingent. A mature comparative
scholarship must ultimately explore the political and historical complexity of
* Charles J. Meyers Professor of Law and Business, Stanford University, and Professor of
Law, Columbia University.
** Professor of Law, Harvard University. This article draws on an earlier report commis-
sioned by Jan Stenbeck, a director and shareholder of Industrif'irvaltnings AB Kinnevik. Gilson's
research was supported by the Kendyl K. Monroe Research Fund and the John M. Olin Program in
Law and Economics, at Stanford Law School. Kraakman's research was supported by the Harvard
Law School Faculty Summer Research Program and the Harvard Program on Law and Economics,
which is funded by the John M. Olin Foundation. We are grateful to Bernard Black, Victor
Brudney, Mathew Chambers, John C. Coffee, Jr., Jeffrey Gordon, R.J. Gormley, Howell Jackson,
Mark J. Roe, Roberta Romano, and participants at the Conference on Institutional Investors and
Corporate Governance, University of Osnabriick, July 9-11, 1992, for helpful comments on an ear-
lier draft of this article.
1. So named for the pioneering treatment of the separation of ownership and control in the
American public corporation by Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. &
GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
2. See, eg., Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 MICH. L. Rnv. 520
(1990); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Controk The Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor,
91 COLUM. L. REv. 1277 (1991); Joseph A. Grundfest, Subordination of American Capital, 27 J.
FIN. ECON. 89 (1990); Michael C. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. R v.,
Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 61; Mark J. Roe, A Political Theory of American Corporate Finance, 91 COLUM.
L. REV. 10 (1991).
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every major corporate governance structure.3 Even before this enterprise is
complete, however, comparative analysis can still carry important policy im-
plications for those of us who have the more limited agenda of making incre-
mental improvements in our own governance structures. Foreign techniques
can be evaluated in terms of their potential contributions to one's own sys-
tem, even without a complete understanding of their origins and function in
their domestic contexts.
In this article, we undertake such a limited exercise in comparative cor-
porate governance as part of a continuing project to devise incremental im-
provements in the American pattern of corporate governance. Our focus
here is a little noted European, and particularly Swedish, form of financial
intermediary, which we call a Managerial Strategic Investment Company
(an "MSIC"), that may be peculiarly suitable for American transplant. The
MSIC's special characteristic is that, consistent with non-U.S. corporate
governance systems, it is an intermediary that serves as an active monitor of
the performance of its portfolio companies. Consistent with the American
corporate governance system, however, its only tie to its portfolio companies
is its equity investment. Unlike the German and Japanese systems, the link
between the financial intermediary and its portfolio companies is one-
dimensional.
Our strategy is intentionally modest: We propose an incremental reform
of American corporate governance that can be implemented within the
broad confines of the existing system. For those who have concluded that
the entire system is fundamentally flawed, so limited a strategy may seem
pointless and, indeed, pernicious. 4 From our perspective, the limits on our
strategy simply reflect the reality of path dependency. More ambitious re-
form may be desirable, but only if it is attainable-a judgment that requires
a far deeper understanding of the contingencies of different governance sys-
tems than we now possess. In the meantime, the measure of our efforts is
whether they can improve the system we have, not whether a deeper restruc-
turing of our pattern of governance would be even better.-
Part I sketches three different patterns of monitoring structures that can
be observed in existing corporate governance systems. This highlights the
special characteristic of the American pattern into which the MSIC must fit
3. Mark J. Roe, Some Differences in Corporate Structure in Germany, Japan, and America, 102
YALE L.J. (forthcoming June 1993) (manuscript on file with the Stanford Law Review) is an ambi-
tious effort in this direction.
4. For example, Michael Porter, of the Harvard Business School Project on the Time Horizons
of American Management, has urged that not only must the entire American corporate governance
system be reformed, including restructuring the American financial system, but that the entire pro-
ject must be accomplished simultaneously. Michael Porter, Remarks at the Securities and Exchange
Commission Public Forum on Corporate Governance and American Competitiveness: The Role of
Shareholders, Directors and Management 53-54 (Mar. 19-20, 1992) (transcript on file with the Stan-
ford Law Review).
5. We are reminded of the retort of the man who, on seeing a charging grizzly bear, stopped to
put on running shoes. When his companion rebuked him, pointing out that the grizzly bear could
not be outrun, he responded that he did not have to outrun the grizzly bear; he only had to outrun
his companion.
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in order to be suitable for transplant-a pattern in which the role of moni-
toring management is assigned primarily to those entities whose sole func-
tion is to supply the corporation with equity capital. In Part II, we
introduce the MSIC as part of our ongoing project of incremental reform; we
describe the structure of the MSIC and explain its fit within the American
pattern of monitoring. Part III considers the regulatory barriers to imple-
menting an MSIC strategy in the United States. Finally, Part IV evaluates
the likelihood of success of an American MSIC strategy from three perspec-
tives: the potential for a conflict of interest between the MSIC and other
shareholders of portfolio companies, the relevance of the closed end mutual
fund paradox to MSICs, and the available empirical evidence on the influ-
ence of large shareholders on firm performance.
I. PATTERNS OF MONITORING
Any system in which separately owned factors of production cooperate
to produce a good or service must have a mechanism that, more or less
successfully, monitors the participants' diligence and quality of perform-
ance. The leading corporate governance systems reflect three quite different
patterns of monitoring: bank-centered monitoring, exchange-centered moni-
toring, and investor-centered monitoring. While no existing system presents
a pure type of any of the patterns, the corporate governance systems of Ger-
many, Japan, and the United States each reflect a characteristic orientation.
For our purposes, that characteristic orientation sets the path-dependent
limits for our strategy of incremental reform. A brief review of the patterns
of monitoring in Germany and Japan will highlight the limitations imposed
by the American pattern into which an MSIC strategy must fit to serve our
goal of incremental reform within the system's overall paradigm. In the
American system, monitoring is limited to investors whose relation to the
corporation is one-dimensional: They provide only equity capital.
A. German Bank-Centered Monitoring
The German system has been characterized as bank-centered monitor-
ing. Representatives of major banks sit on the supervisory boards of the
leading German industrial corporations. 6 In that capacity, bank representa-
tives are truly independent of management because they serve at the instance
of the banks, not management. The influence of the banks appears to result
from their multidimensional relationship with German industry. German
banks have historically been a major source of debt capital for German in-
dustry,7 and the primacy of debt capital leverages not only the borrower's
6. See Theodor Baums, Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks (Stanford
University, Center for Economic Policy Research Publications No. 311, Aug. 1992) (reporting the
extent of bank representation on the boards of directors of the 100 largest German firms). Bank
managers of the nine largest banks had one or more seats on the supervisory boards of 96 of the
largest 100 firms, and a bank representative was president of 14 such firms.
7. See ALFRED D. CHANDLER, JR., SCALE AND SCOPE: THE DYNAMICS OF INDUSTRIAL CAP-
ITALISM 415-19 (1990).
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capital structure, but the lender's influence as well. But provision of credit is
not the only lever of power held by the banks. In forty-two of the 100 larg-
est German companies, three banks control an average of 45 percent of each
company's voting stock.8 This concentration of voting control comes from
three sources: the banks' direct stock holdings, the holdings of mutual funds
operated by the banks, and the proxy votes of bearer shares deposited with
banks through the banks' stock brokerage operations.9
Taken together, the universal bank sits at the epicenter of German cor-
porate governance. The combined roles of lender, record and beneficial
stockholder, and director put the bank representative in a unique monitoring
position. It has the position, information, and power to effectively monitor
the activity of management and, when necessary, to discipline
management. 10
B. Japanese Exchange-Centered Monitoring
The Japanese corporate governance system, while sharing with the Ger-
man system an important role for large banks,11 differs markedly in its pat-
tern of monitoring, because an important element of the system is its focus
on supporting efficient, productive exchange between affiliated companies,
rather than the agency problem itself.1 2 The keiretsu, especially in its verti-
8. Roe, supra note 3, at app., tbl. I. Expanding the analysis to include five banks raises the
average to above 50% of each company's voting stock. Id.
9. Id at 10; see also THEODOR BAUMS, BANKS AND CORPORATE CONTROL (University of
California at Berkeley, Program in Law and Economics Working Paper No. 91-1, July 1991). While
many German companies have adopted bylaw provisions that cap the voting power of any single
shareholder at 5%, these limits do not apply to banks in their capacity as proxy holders; apparently
the calculation is based on beneficial ownership. Baums, supra note 6, at 6.
For an account of the German system of depository voting, see Johannes K6ndgen, Duties of
Banks in Voting Their Clients' Stock (paper presented at the Conference on Institutional Investors
and Corporate Governance, University of Osnabriick, July 9-11, 1992) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
10. How energetically the banks actually exercise the power inherent in their unique position
remains uncertain. See, e.g., Baums, supra note 6, at 6. However, the banks' absolute power to elect
nonemployee representatives to the supervisory board through control of a majority of the voting
stock, and the exercise of that control through the placement of bank representatives on supervisory
boards, creates the potential for effective control whether or not it is actually exercised. Id. Of
course, the more effective the exercise of power, the more difficult it may be to observe. However, at
least the banks' proxy voting power depends on the terms of German corporate legislation. If Ger-
man corporations can make a credible claim that the banks' exercise of voting power would be met
by corporate sponsored efforts to amend the relevant corporate legislation, the absence of observable
exercise of power by the banks may have a different interpretation. In this regard, Professor Kiibler
reports that in recent years German banks have taken the public position that they wish to relinquish
their role as proxy holders. See Friedrich Kiibler, Institutional Ownership and Corporate Govern-
ance: A German Perspective 13 n.53 (paper presented at the Conference on Institutional Investors
and Corporate Governance, University of Osnabriick, July 9-11, 1992) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
11. See, e.g., Masahiko Aoki, Toward an Economic Model of the Japanese Firm, 28 J. ECON.
LITERATURE 1, 14-16 (1990); Paul Sheard, The Main Bank System and Corporate Monitoring and
Control in Japan, 11 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 399, 401-03 (1989); Paul Sheard, Dele-
gated Monitoring Among Delegated Monitors: Principal-Agent Aspects of the Japanese Main Bank
System 2-3 (Apr. 1991) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
12. See Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese Keiretsu: Overlaps
Between Corporate Governance and Industrial Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 881-82 (1993).
[Vol. 45:985
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
cal form, is composed of a group of firms which typically share two relation-
ships: cross-exchanges and cross-shareholdings. Member firms hold equity
positions in other group members and supply each other with factors of pro-
duction.1 3 A keiretsu's main bank may be first in both the size of its cross-
shareholdings and the importance of the factor of production it provides, but
for our purposes, the critical characteristic is the multidimensional monitor-
ing pattern. While the main bank may once have monitored projects in its
role as major lender,14 and still leads rescue operations in the event of cri-
sis, 15 real-time day-to-day monitoring of performance occurs through the
substantive exchange relationship between nonfinancial members of the
keiretsu. For example, a just-in-time inventory system provides not just
parts, but current information about the quality of a supplier's perform-
ance. 16 Thus, the Japanese monitoring pattern, like the German pattern in
this critical respect, reflects a multidimensional relationship between the
company and its monitors.
C. American Investor-Centered Monitoring
For reasons explored most thoroughly by Mark Roe, the American cor-
porate governance system has sharply constrained the development of mul-
tidimensional governance relationships. 17 By restricting the size of banks
and the scope and geographical range of their activities, the regulatory web
enveloping the American financial services industry has tightly restricted
bank influence. Neither their credit provision function nor their limited eq-
uity ownership1 8 provide banks with sufficient power and incentive to
monitor.
13. The extent of these features depends on whether a keiretsu is primarily horizontal or verti-
cal. A horizontal keiretsu comprises firms which span a wide range of industries, while a vertical
relationship is industry-specific. For helpful descriptions of the keiretsu structure, see MICHAEL L.
GERLACH, ALLIANCE CAPITALISM: THE SOCIAL ORGANIZATION OF JAPANESE BUSINESS 4-6
(1992); Ulrike Schaede, Corporate Governance in Japan: Institutional Investors, Management Mon-
itoring and Corporate Stakeholders 11-20 (paper presented at the Conference on Institutional Inves-
tors and Corporate Governance, University of Osnabrilck, July 9-11, 1992) (on file with the Stanford
Law Review).
14. See W. CARL KESTER, JAPANESE TAKEOVERS: THE GLOBAL CONTEST FOR CORPORATE
CONTROL 195-97 (1991) (observing that successful Japanese firms are now free from main bank
review of strategy and capital budgeting); Paul Sheard, Japanese Corporate Finance and Behaviour:
Recent Developments and the Impact of Deregulation, in JAPANESE FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE
ROLE OF THE YEN 55, 56 (Colin McKenzie & Michael Stutchbury eds., 1992) (noting that from the
early 1970s to mid-1980s, the percentage of the net increase in corporate funds from bank borrow-
ings dropped from 41% to 6%).
15. See Aoki, supra note 11, at 15-16; Takeo Hoshi, Anil Kashyap & David Schaffstein, The
Role of Banks in Reducing the Costs of Financial Distress in Japan, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 67, 73-74
(1990).
16. See Aoki, supra note 11, at 5. Likewise, cross-shareholdings prevent opportunism and
thereby support investment by keiretsu members in relation-specific assets. The investment provides
both a monitoring relationship and supplies the necessary incentive to monitor. Joint investment in
relation-specific assets in the face of a competitive market means that the value of one party's invest-
ment is hostage to the performance of the other. Thus, the means and the motive for day-to-day
monitoring are provided simultaneously. Gilson & Roe, supra note 12, at 892.
17. See Roe, supra note 2, at 10; Roe, supra note 3, at 1-9.
18. Bank holding companies are prohibited from holding more than 5% of a portfolio com-
April 1993]
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As a result, the monitoring role in the American corporate governance
system is relegated to those who provide only equity capital to the corpora-
tion-the shareholders. This characteristic has forced American governance
institutions to follow a unique Berle-Means pattern of successive efforts,
ranging from independent directors to hostile takeovers, to bridge the sepa-
ration of ownership and management in the face of dispersed shareholdings.
The formal governance structure of the Berle-Means corporation, under
which a board of directors elected by shareholders monitors management,
has been less than effective. To be sure, almost three-quarters of the direc-
tors of publicly-held companies in the United States are independent in the
formal sense that they are not full-time company employees.1 9 Nevertheless,
because outside directors are typically chosen by management,20 and be-
cause 63 percent of outside directors are chief executives of other publicly-
held companies, 2 1 such directors have traditionally had little commitment to
or enthusiasm for active monitoring. Hostile takeovers have been a pecu-
liarly Anglo-American phenomenon, reflecting in part the absence of effec-
tive monitoring mechanisms whose operation would be triggered short of the
dramatic value gap necessary to make a control fight economically viable.22
Thus, the American corporate governance pattern has restricted the
monitoring function to investors, but the dispersal of shareholdings has pre-
vented investors from making serious efforts to discharge the monitoring
function. This structure sets the framework for efforts at incremental reform
of American capital governance: How can investors whose only link to the
corporation is the provision of equity capital develop the capacity to monitor
management effectively?
II. INCREMENTAL GOVERNANCE REFORM AND THE MSIC
The one-dimensional character of corporate governance in the United
States goes far toward reducing corporate monitoring to a simple agency
problem between shareholders and managers. Such simplicity makes gov-
ernance particularly transparent in the American context. Unfortunately, it
also greatly limits the range of incremental reforms that might improve cor-
porate monitoring within the confines of the larger governance system. On
one hand, only shareholders can monitor management. On the other hand,
shareholders, when small and dispersed, lack the incentive to become effec-
tive monitors unless the costs of collective action can be reduced to make
pany, and, as interpreted by regulators, the 5% holding must be passive. See Roe, supra note 3, at
19.
19. JAY W. LORSCH & ELIZABETH MACIVER, PAWNS OR POTENTATES: THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CORPORATE BOARDS 17 (1989).
20. "[O]ur data reveal that ... many directors still feel they are serving at the pleasure of the
CEO-chairman." Id.
21. Id. at 18.
22. Michael Porter states the issue straightforwardly: "Investors exercise little real influence
on managements, and are rarely represented on boards of directors. The only mechanism left to
discipline poorly performing managements is takeovers or mergers .... " MICHAEL E. PORTER,
THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 529 (1990).
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coordinated monitoring feasible. It follows that any practical reform propo-
sal must address the costs of collective action, the size of shareholdings, or
both.23
Our initial reform proposal built upon an already existing opportunity to
improve monitoring.24 Due to recent increases in the scale of institutional
shareholdings, the costs of collective action among institutional shareholders
have significantly decreased. 25 In our earlier proposal, we urged institu-
tional investors, and particularly public pension funds, to resurrect the cor-
porate board as a monitoring structure by supporting a new class of
professional independent directors. The key feature of professional directors
would not merely be their independence from management but, more impor-
tantly, their dependence on shareholders and, in particular, on institutional
shareholders for their continued tenure as directors. In short, we proposed
to reward good monitors with very good jobs on the condition that they
remain good monitors on behalf of shareholder interests.26
In this article, we offer a second reform proposal-the MSIC as a guard-
ian shareholder-that complements our proposal for professional directors.
Where the professional director strategy provided a blueprint for coopera-
tion among large but individually powerless shareholders, the MSIC strategy
would internalize such cooperation through a new entity that would itself
acquire sufficient shareholdings to support effective monitoring. The MSIC
strategy is the more novel reform proposal, insofar as it would open the
American market to a new investment form. In another sense, however, the
MSIC strategy is the more conservative reform. A new investment vehicle
takes time to develop, and because it is likely to start small, it is also likely to
have its initial effect on smaller corporations. Moreover, because the MSIC
strategy does not implicate the regulatory restrictions on coordinated activ-
23. See Black, supra note 2, at 525.
24. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for
Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863, 883-92 (1991); see also Ronald J. Gilson, Lilli A.
Gordon & John Pound, How the Proxy Rules Discourage Constructive Engagement: Regulatory Bar-
riers to Electing a Minority of Directors, 17 J. CORP. L. 29, 45-47 (1991) (proposing proxy rule
reform to facilitate election of minority director slates by institutional investors, adopted by the SEC
in its recent package of proxy rule revisions).
25. Institutional investors now purportedly own more than half of the stock of the largest
American corporations. Carolyn Kay Brancato, The Pivotal Role ofInstitutional Investors in Capital
Markets, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTING: CHALLENGES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE 21ST CEN-
TURY 3, at 21, tbl. 1-7 (Arnold W. Sametz & James L. Bicksler eds., 1991).
26. Our goal was to design a position that would be desirable to individuals with the skills to be
effective monitors. The desire to retain an attractive position would create a performance incentive
that outside directors currently lack. In other words, we hoped to create a real market for outside
directors. We suggested a full-time position obligating each expert to serve on the boards of perhaps
six corporations. Total compensation from board fees and benefits easily might exceed $250,000.
Individuals with the required talents "could undoubtedly earn more in other employment, but they
would be hard-pressed to match the intrinsic interest of the professional director's work or the social
prestige that multiple directorships would confer." Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 885.
Such directors would then have the two essential resources for effective monitoring that traditional
outside directors lack: a focused mandate, provided by the desire to retain a position truly filled by
shareholders; and sufficient time to spend on a company's affairs, provided by the full-time character
of the position.
Ap-ril 1993]
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ity among existing investors or call upon public pension funds to take a lead-
ing role in reform, it is immune to the legal and political objections that
some critics have made to our proposal for professional directors.27
A. The Structure of the MSIC
We define an MSIC as a publicly-traded financial intermediary-a
closed-end investment company-that pursues a core strategy of making
large and active equity investments in a small portfolio of public companies.
As such, the MSIC form is virtually unknown in the United States.28 Yet, it
seems commonplace in Europe, where many of the largest corporate
"groups" can be classified as MSICs. 29 The MSIC form is particularly
prominent in Sweden, where its role in corporate governance has received
widespread recognition.
Like financial investors in the United States, most Swedish financial in-
vestors are legally disabled from intervening in the affairs of public corpora-
tions. Swedish banks lack significant share holdings, and Swedish law limits
the stakes of insurance companies, mutual funds, employee stock ownership
funds, and pension funds to less than 5 percent of the voting stock of individ-
ual companies.30 Unlike the United States, however, Sweden permits closed-
end investment companies to function as true MSICs, which are not only
allowed to invest actively in public corporations, but are encouraged to do
so. 31 As a result, publicly-held MSICs are presently the second largest insti-
27. See Black, supra note 2, at 530; Coffee, supra note 2, at 1359-62; Martin Lipton & Steven
A. Rosenblum, .4 New System of Corporate Governance The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58
U. CHi. L. REv. 187, 206 (1991); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Insti-
tutional Shareholder Activism, 79 GEO. L.J. 445, 474-75 (1991).
28. In Part III, we show that the Investment Company Act of 1940 effectively prohibits Amer-
ican MSICs. Warren Buffett's investment vehicle, Berkshire Hathaway, Inc., is the closest approxi-
mation to an MSIC in the United States. See text accompanying note 79 infra.
29. Established European MSICs include VIAG AG in Germany; Societe Generale de
Belgique (Generale) in Belgium; Groupe Suez and Pechelbrorm in France; and Ferruzzi Finanziaria,
Compagnie Industriali Riunite (CIR), Instituto Finanziario Industriale (IFI) in Italy. We describe
two prominent Swedish MSICs, Industrivirden and Kinnevik, in greater detail at note 34 infra and
accompanying text. Each of these MSICs maintains a portfolio of large operating companies in
which it is a controlling shareholder, a portfolio of public corporations in which it is a "strategic
partner" or large-block investor, and a much larger number of investments in small or start-up
private firms. The MSICs differ in the relative sizes of their controlling shareholder, large-block
shareholder, and private portfolios. The English editions of their most recent annual reports include
detailed accounts of their holdings. For a discussion of the Belgian version of the MSIC, see Eddy
Wymeersch, Institutional Investors and Financial Groups in Belgium (paper presented at the Con-
ference on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, University of Osnabriick, July 9-11,
1992) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).
30. Rolf Skog & Mats Isaksson, Ownership and Control in the Swedish Business Sector 8-9
(paper presented at the Conference on Institutional Investors and Corporate Governance, University
of Osnabriick, July 9-11, 1992) (on file with the Stanford Law Review). Skog and Isaksson provide
an English summary of the report of the Swedish Parliamentary Commission on Stock Ownership
and Efficiency, which was submitted to the Swedish Parliament in 1988. For further discussion of
the Swedish Parliamentary Commission's report, see Coffee, supra note 2, at 1306-08.
31. Thus, the Swedish Parliamentary Commission on Stock Ownership and Efficiency "consid-
ers it important that investment companies are able to continue to exercise this [active ownership]
function and find [sic] it worthwhile considering whether the tax situation of investment companies
[Vol. 45:985
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tutional holders of equities. 32 Moreover, their prominent position in the
Swedish market has led to public recognition of their capacity to monitor the
performance of Sweden's public corporations.33
To see how Swedish MSICs have earned such recognition, consider two
large Swedish MSICs: AB Industriv'irden and Industriffirvaltnings AB Kin-
nevik. Like the typical American closed-end investment fund, one of these
Swedish MSICs (Kinnevik) devotes a portion of its capital to a diversified
portfolio of publicly-traded securities; and like an American venture capital
fund, both MSICs are controlling parents of several closely-held start-up
companies. However, their central investment strategy-taking strategic
minority positions in a handful of publicly-traded operating companies-
lacks an American counterpart. These positions, which range from 3 to 49
percent of the voting equity of the companies in their strategic portfolios, are
large enough to assure board representation, but too small to provide out-
right voting control.34
The Swedish MSICs are also long-term investors in their strategic portfo-
lio companies. Large holdings are rarely sold except as a result of a merger
or similar restructuring of an affiliated operating company.35 In addition, as
significant minority investors, the Swedish MSICs play an active role in the
management of their affiliated companies. Like American leveraged buyout
syndicates and venture capital firms, 3 6 they maintain a staff of senior manag-
ought to be changed" to encourage further large-block holdings. Skog & Isaksson, supra note 30, at
26.
32. As of January 1992, Swedish MSICs held 10% of the total market capitalization of the
Stockholm Stock Exchange, insurance companies (which also manage pension assets) held 15%, and
mutual funds held 9%. Mats Isaksson & Rolf Skog, Corporate Governance in Swedish Listed Com-
panies 4 (Nov. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review). Proportionate
MSIC holdings were higher in 1985, when, after a decade of growth, they reached 16% of total
market capitalization and constituted the largest class of Swedish institutional equity holdings. Skog
& Isaksson, supra note 30, at 12, tbl. 1. The decline in the relative size of MSIC holdings since 1985
resulted in part from changes in Swedish tax law that favored mutual funds and private pension
insurance policies, and in part from a persistent closed-end fund discount that dogged Swedish
MSICs in the 1980s. Id. at 5-6 (regarding Swedish tax law changes); see text accompanying notes
84-89 infra (discussing closed-end fund discounts). Yet, the magnitude of the decline in Swedish
MSIC holdings is probably overstated in a comparison of the 1985 and 1992 data. The 1992 data,
but not the 1985 data, include Swedish equities held by nonfinancial companies (20% of total equi-
ties). Since these nonfinancial companies are themselves held largely by financial investors, breaking
out nonfinancial equity holdings dilutes the proportionate holdings of financial investors, including
MSICs, in the 1992 data.
33. Skog & Isaksson, supra note 30, at 26, 29-30.
34. See AB INDUSTRIVARDEN, NINE-MONTH REPORT: JANUARY 1-SEPTEMBER 30, 1990, at
14-15 (1990) (holdings from 3% to 26% of voting equity in 10 public companies); INDUS-
TRIF6RVALTNINGS AB KINNEVIK, 1989 ANNUAL REPORT 31 (1990) [hereinafter KINNEVIK]
(holdings from 10% to 49% of voting equity in five public companies). In this regard, MSICs differ
from their Belgian counterparts, which are more likely to hold an absolute majority of the stock in
their portfolio companies. See Wymeersch, supra note 29, at 10-16.
35. See, eg., Letter from Jan Stenbeck to Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, Securities and Ex-
change Commission 2 (Oct. 10, 1990) (on file with the Stanford Law Review) (detailing Kinnevik's
policy of stable holdings).
36. For a discussion of the operation of leveraged buyout firms, see Jensen, supra note 2, at 61.
The relationship of venture capital funds to their portfolio companies is described in William A.
Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 473
(1990).
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ers with operating expertise to advise the managements of their affiliated
companies and, when necessary, to press for changes in the management of
unsuccessful companies. 37
However, these MSICs differ from leveraged buyout syndicates in two
important respects. First, MSICs are themselves publicly-held companies,
meaning they are not restricted to raising capital through bonds and bank
loans; they can also issue new stock. Second, MSICs ordinarily assume a
minority, rather than controlling, position in other public firms-an invest-
ment rather than a takeover. As a result, MSICs establish a symbiotic rela-
tionship with smaller public shareholders in their operating companies.
Because such operating companies still have public shareholders, the MSICs
enjoy the benefit of a market price by which to measure the performance of
their publicly-held assets.38 In turn, smaller investors in a company held in
an MSIC portfolio obtain the services of a guardian shareholder-an in-
dependent monitor on the board who actively safeguards the interests of all
shareholders. Anecdotal evidence indicates that public investors in an
MSIC's operating affiliates closely follow the MSIC's investment decisions
and policy recommendations. 39
B. The Fit of MSICs in the American Governance System
In Sweden, as well as elsewhere in Europe, MSICs are specialized gov-
ernance responses to particular regulatory and political environments. Nev-
ertheless, precisely because these MSICs mediate between dispersed
shareholders and the managements of public corporations, and because their
relationship with their portfolio companies is one-dimensional-the only tie
is through their equity investments-they are consistent with the American
pattern of corporate governance. Moreover, it appears that MSICs perform
a monitoring function in their national markets that no existing American
institution fully serves in our own market. Direct control of operating com-
panies by America's existing financial investors-pension funds, banks, and
insurance companies-is simply not in the cards. A dramatic revival of the
takeover market, even if possible, would be a costly substitute for effective
internal governance. And a meaningful reform of the existing system of
outside directors, which we believe is both desirable and feasible, has yet to
command the attention of institutional investors whose cooperative action
37. See Letter from Jan Stenbeck to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 35, at 2-3.
38. Katherine Schipper & Abbie Smith, A Comparison of Equity Carve-Outs and Seasoned Eq-
uity Offerings: Share Price Effects and Corporate Restructuring, 15 J. FIN. ECON. 153 (1986) (offering
empirical evidence on the value of market performance measurement).
39. Further evidence of the quality of the active investment services provided by Swedish
MSICs lies in the fact that MSIC shareholders are often savvy investors themselves, in contrast with
the United States, where institutional investors seldom invest in closed-end investment companies.
For example, two-thirds of Industrivirden's stock is held by 10 institutions, including major insur-
ance companies and pension funds. AB INDUSTRIVRDEN, supra note 34, at 11. The remaining
shares are held by about 15,000 investors. Id. It thus appears that the Swedish MSICs are market
devices for collectivizing the monitoring costs of all public investors, large and small.
[Vol. 45:985
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
would be necessary to implement it.4° Against this backdrop, a proposal to
allow American MSICs to take long-term stakes in public companies could
make an important contribution to governance reform as well as to the wel-
fare of individual investors.
Following the European MSIC model, American MSICs would invest in
small numbers of companies selected for their potential value and their com-
patibility with the business expertise of the MSIC managers. A range of
MSIC strategies might be possible. For example, some MSICs might spe-
cialize in the rehabilitation of distressed or poorly performing companies,
while others might target rapidly growing firms needing equity capital.
Whatever an MSIC's strategic focus, however, MSIC investments would
generally be friendly transactions, if only because the MSIC strategy turns
on obtaining effective board representation without waging a costly control
contest. Although some corporate managements might turn down an
MSIC's offer of capital for board representation, others would accept it for
the same reasons that many American companies now welcome large private
investors. MSICs could not threaten to displace management or alter corpo-
rate policy without the support of non-MSIC directors and investors, be-
cause their investments would be limited to minority stakes. In addition,
MSICs would contribute stable equity financing, and the MSIC's decision to
invest would itself be a credible signal to the market of a company's qual-
ity.41 The MSIC would thus serve to secure management's position in many
circumstances, although its continued willingness to perform this function
would depend entirely on its expert evaluation of management's
performance.
From the corporate governance perspective, the MSIC's chief value
would stem from its ability to monitor management's performance. As pro-
fessionals charged with their employer's interests, MSIC directors would not
only be financially independent of the management of portfolio companies,
they would be financially dependent on shareholder interests. Thus, MSIC
directors would possess precisely the incentive to monitor-and, if need be,
to challenge-the policies of an unsuccessful management that outside direc-
tors now lack. Because MSIC board members would be experienced profes-
sionals able to devote their full attention to a small number of operating
companies, they would possess the time, expertise, and support services nec-
essary to monitor effectively. Finally, although MSICs would not attempt to
dictate corporate policy or unilaterally displace unsuccessful managers, the
40. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 24, at 886-88. The recent aggressiveness of the outside
directors at General Motors, American Express, and Westinghouse provides some reason for opti-
mism. However, in all three cases, the boards acted only after a long period of poor performance.
See, eg., Bill Saporito, The Toppling of King James III, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 42; Thomas A.
Stewart, The King Is Dead, FORTUNE, Jan. 11, 1993, at 34. Thus, the need for board reform
remains.
41. Berkshire Hathaway's 14% stake in the total voting equity in Salomon, Inc. dramatically
illustrates both the value of an MSIC-like investment as a source of stable capital, and the contribu-
tion that a large shareholder can make in stabilizing the market's perception of a firm in crisis. Cf
note 99 infra (discussing Berkshire Hathaway's presence on the board of Salomon, Inc.).
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views of MSIC directors-backed by between 10 and 35 percent of a com-
pany's voting stock42-would likely carry the influence to force out an un-
successful management team, even if it might lack the power to dictate a
successor.
43
Individual shareholders of both the MSIC and its portfolio companies
would benefit directly from a successful MSIC strategy. MSIC shareholders
would gain to the extent that MSIC monitoring increased the value of port-
folio companies and, hence, the value of the MSIC. In addition, non-MSIC
shareholders of portfolio companies would benefit from the increased value
of the portfolio companies that would result from MSIC monitoring.44 This
effect might be especially pronounced, moreover, because MSICs could be
expected to invest only in companies where their business expertise and
monitoring skills could be used to maximum advantage.
Even in a favorable regulatory climate, MSICs would hardly be a pan-
acea for America's corporate governance problems, if only because their in-
vestments would be dwarfed by those of traditional financial investors, such
as pension and mutual funds. The magnitude of MSIC investments would
also be constrained by the availability of suitable investment candidates, and
by the small number of companies that any single MSIC would be able to
invite into a long-term partnership. Unlike the corporate raiders of the
1980s, MSICs would earn their returns the hard way: not from the rapid
turnover of corporate assets, but from their operation, from the cultivation
of sound management, and from productive efficiency. Thus, the typical
MSIC portfolio might invest in only ten or fifteen companies over the course
of a decade.45
Despite these limitations on their direct influence, the MSIC strategy
could be expected to affect the entire corporate governance system indi-
rectly, as a working demonstration of the value of highly motivated profes-
sional directors. Such directors would be particularly easy to recruit and
compensate through the MSIC form. They would simply be the full-time
42. Jan Stenbeck recently suggested this range of holdings in a proposal to exempt MSICs
from various provisions of the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1988 & Supp.
1991). See Jan Stenbeck, Proposed Amendment of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to Facili-
tate Operations of Managerial Strategic Investment Companies, at B-1 (Feb. 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Stanford Law Review).
43. Even here, the minority character of the MSIC investment would require it to operate both
collectively, through a coalition with traditional outside directors, and independently. Because such
outside directors are quite effective when issues are framed for them, see LoRScH & MACIVER, supra
note 19, at 97-139, a conflict between MSIC directors and management might energize traditional
outside directors, an important corporate resource, see Gilson, Gordon & Pound, supra note 24, at
32-33.
44. Recall that such monitoring gains have been officially noted in Sweden. See Skog & Isaks-
son, supra note 30, at 26. In addition, the American empirical literature, which we review in text
accompanying notes 80-99 infra, suggests that public companies in which significant shareholders
play an active management role perform systematically better than companies in which they do not.
See notes 92-99 infra and accompanying text.
45. For example, the two relatively large Swedish MSICs discussed above presently hold only
10 and five companies respectively in their strategic portfolios. See AB INDUSTmVXARDEN, supra
note 34, at 14-15; KINNEVIK, supra note 34, at 31.
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MSIC employees designated to serve on the boards of portfolio companies.
We have argued elsewhere46 that the real impediments to the use of profes-
sional directors by institutional investors in America are practical: Ameri-
can inexperience with the role of the professional director, the costs of
recruiting and electing such directors, the frequently exaggerated legal risks
to institutional investors that might arise from backing professional direc-
tors,47 and, finally, the simple absence of a model. The success of an Ameri-
can MSIC could reduce these costs by familiarizing institutional investors
and corporate managers alike with the value of professional directors. Thus,
successful American MSICs would encourage other institutional investors to
pursue similar board-centered efforts to reform corporate governance.
In sum, a powerful corporate governance rationale exists for facilitating
the MSIC form, quite apart from the novel investment opportunity that the
MSIC would create for public investors. A successful MSIC strategy would
directly benefit the managers and shareholders of public companies in which
MSICs invested by providing long-term capital, business expertise, and a
guardian shareholder to monitor management's performance. In addition,
successful MSICs would have much to teach other institutional investors
about the monitoring capabilities of the board and the value of highly moti-
vated professional directors.48
III. REGULATORY OBSTACLES TO THE MSIC FORM
An obvious question arises from our conclusion that the MSIC form not
only fits the American framework of corporate governance, but also provides
a plausible market response to the agency costs of that framework: Why are
there no American MSICs? We find much of the answer in the legal obsta-
cles created by the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act")49 and
its associated regulations. 50
46. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 24.
47. IM at 894-905 (discussing the legal risks); see also Black, supra note 2, at 530-66 (surveying
the full range of regulatory barriers to electing professional directors).
48. We are not alone in suggesting that MSIC-like institutions can be introduced in new juris-
dictions. The potential for financial intermediaries to play the role of guardian shareholder has
figured prominently in proposals concerning the institutional structure of privatization in Eastern
Europe. See, eg.. Roman Frydman & Andrzej Rapaczynski, Markets and Institutions in Large-
Scale Privatization: An Approach to Economic and Social Transformation in Eastern Europe, in RE-
FORMING CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN ECONOMIES: INITIAL RESULTS AND CHALLENGES
253, 262-67 (Vittorio Corbo, Fabrizio Coricelli & Jan Bossak eds., 1991); David Lipton & Jeffrey
Sachs, Privatization in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland, in REFORMING CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPEAN ECONOMIES, supra, at 231, 240-42.
49. 15 U.S.C. § 80a (1988 & Supp. 1991).
50. The Internal Revenue Code creates further regulatory obstacles to the formation of Ameri-
can MSICs. Subchapter M provides investment companies which meet its requirements with
favorable pass-through tax status-that is, only the investors, and not the investment company, are
taxed on dividends received by the investment company and on capital gains. A company can only
attain this status if it satisfies specific diversification requirements intended to deny "special treat-
ment to companies which undertake to control the enterprises in which the bulk of their funds are
placed." H.R. REP. No. 586, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 34 (151). A nonqualifying MSIC's dividend
income would be taxed at an effective rate of 10%, its capital gains might be taxed at 34%, and
distributions from the MSIC to its investors would be taxed again at ordinary rates. See Mark J.
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As Mark Roe has argued, the 1940 Act is one of the half-dozen major
federal statutes that methodically disables financial investors from major
participation in corporate governance.51 The Act's broad definition of "in-
vestment company" includes, inter alia, any issuer of securities that holds
more than 40 percent of its assets in the form of investment securities.-2 All
investment companies, in turn, are regulated by the Act unless they qualify
for an express "exception" or an exemption. An American MSIC could not
escape the Act's provisions on either ground. In particular, as a publicly-
traded investment company, an MSIC would be ineligible for the private
investment company exception;53 and as an investment company holding
minority stakes in portfolio companies rather than exercising outright con-
trol, an MSIC would not qualify for the so-called holding company excep-
Roe, Political Elements in the Creation of a Mutual Fund Industry, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1469, 1479
(1991). The potential for such double taxation undoubtedly handicaps the MSIC form, but it is less
preclusive than the 1940 Act provisions described infra; because the MSIC can avoid much of the
impact of double taxation through its investment strategy, although at some cost in restricted invest-
ment scope. Roe argues that these restrictions are unjustifiable even if they are only costly, but not
preclusive. Id.
First, the MSIC could invest in portfolio companies that do not pay dividends (using its influ-
ence to assure the continuation of that policy) and retain those investments for the long term. The
former eliminates the dividend tax at the MSIC level; the latter defers any capital gains tax, thereby
reducing the present value of the double taxation of capital gains. Of course, investing for the long
term is not just a tax driven strategy for MSICs, but their very goal.
Second, an MSIC could qualify for favorable tax treatment without too significant a restriction
on its core investment strategy. I.R.C. § 851(b)(4) (1992) restricts pass-through taxation to compa-
nies that satisfy two diversification standards. The first requires that 50% of an MSIC's investments
be in securities, which, with respect to any issuer, exceed neither 5% of the MSIC's total assets, nor
represent more than 10% of the outstanding voting stock of the issuer. I.R.C. §§ 851(b)(4)(A)(i)-
(ii). Thus, an MSIC could invest 50% of its assets in acquiring 10% of the voting stock of each of 10
companies and still meet the Code's requirements. The second requires that an MSIC invest no
more than 25% of its assets in any single issuer. I.R.C. § 851(b)(4)(B). Thus, an MSIC could use
50% of its assets to purchase large-block (or even controlling) stock positions in portfolio companies
so long as no single large-block position represented more than 25% of its total assets.
To be sure, complying with § 841(b)'s diversification requirements does restrict an MSIC's in-
vestment strategy, but not seriously. For example, an MSIC could invest 50% of its assets in 10%
positions in 10 companies, and 50% of its assets in 25% to 40% positions in a few additional compa-
nies. Such a portfolio is very similar to those maintained by the Swedish MSICs. See AB INDUS-
TRIVXRDEN, supra note 34, at 14-15; KINNEVIK, supra note 34, at 31. The principle restriction, in
addition to limiting MSIC large-block positions to 50% of its assets, is limiting the relative size of
the companies in which large-block positions are taken to 25% of an MSIC's assets.
For a more pessimistic view of the impact of § 851(b)'s restrictions, see Roe, supra, at 1479.
51. See Roe, supra note 50, at 1503-07.
52. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3) (1988).
53. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1), which excepts from the 1940 Act's coverage investment com-
panies that are beneficially owned by fewer than 100 persons. Traditionally, this exception has al-
lowed small numbers of wealthy individual and institutional investors to pursue MSIC-like
investment strategies. Given the large holdings of institutional investors, the absence of larger num-
bers of "private" MSICs is puzzling. For present purposes, it is sufficient to note two limiting fac-
tors: the widespread commitment of institutions to very broadly diversified portfolios comprised of
many hundreds of stocks; and a reluctance, currently diminishing, to involve themselves in control
related investments. Recent efforts to create private MSIC-like vehicles, such as Allied Investment
Partners and the Lens Fund, suggest slow change. See Morton Paulsen, Monks Sets His Sights on
Sears: Corporate Gadflys "Lens Fund" Targets "Underachievers" 6 TURNAROUNDS & WORKOUTS,
June 15, 1992, at 1; Randall Smith & James A. White, White-Squire Fund Boasts Old Boys and
White Shoes, WALL ST. J., Nov. 1, 1991, at Cl.
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tion to the Act's coverage. 54
Because the provisions of the 1940 Act apply, an American MSIC would
be forced to comply with a comprehensive and highly technical set of sub-
stantive regulations designed to protect naive participants in the very differ-
ent investment vehicles of a mutual fund or diversified closed-end investment
fund. Although none of these provisions explicitly precludes an American
MSIC, they impose numerous costs and rigidities that effectively achieve the
same result. Only a lengthy exegesis of the 1940 Act could do justice to all
of the obstacles that it creates.5 5 Several representative examples, however,
should suffice to establish the 1940 Act's prohibitive effect.
Consider first the problem of compensating managers of MSICs who
would also serve as directors of portfolio firms. Since these managers would
add value by serving as high-level monitors, MSIC investors might prefer
performance-based compensation schedules closely tied to increases in the
value of the MSIC itself. However, the 1940 Act bars the logical elements of
such a compensation plan. Under the Act, an MSIC could neither issue long
term stock options nor award its managers with equity securities of any sort
in exchange for their services. 56 A compensation restriction designed to pro-
tect investors in passive investment funds from dilution by insiders would
thus preclude the most common incentive compensation devices found
outside the topsy-turvy world of investment companies.
Even more serious impediments to MSICs are contained in the 1940
Act's many restrictions on the ability of investment companies to raise new
capital or make distributions. Section 23(b), 57 which bars closed-end invest-
ment companies from issuing equity at a price below net asset value, would
make it extremely difficult for an MSIC to raise additional equity capital on
the market apart from its initial public offering. For reasons that remain
poorly understood, shares in closed-end investment companies-a category
that would include American MSICs 58-tend to trade at a discount to the
54. Under Rule 3a-l(a)(4), the securities of a portfolio company controlled by an investment
company, whether by virtue of holding a majority of voting equity or otherwise, do not count as
investment securities for purposes of determining jurisdiction of the 1940 Act. Rule 3a-l(a)(4), 17
C.F.R. § 270.3a-l(a)(4) (1992). The paradoxical result is that the 1940 Act exempts control blocks
and holding companies from regulation, while systematically disfavoring the MSIC strategy of exer-
cising influence on the governance of portfolio companies through large-block minority holdings.
This represents another instance in which federal securities regulations favor acquisitions of control
over efforts to acquire minority positions. See Gilson, Gordon & Pound, supra note 24, at 33-42.
55. The Stenbeck proposal to amend the 1940 Act to facilitate American MSICs requests ex-
emption from no fewer than 15 of the Act's central provisions. See Stenbeck, supra note 42, at C-2
to C-3. A parallel analysis of how, prior to 1980, the Act precluded publicly-traded venture capital
funds from investing in start-up companies may be found in commentary on the 1980 Amendments.
See, eg., Reginald L. Thomas & Paul F. Roye, Regulation of Business Development Companies
Under the Investment Company Act, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 895, 906-10 (1982). These Amendments
were adopted expressly to facilitate public venture capital financing of start-up firms (termed "busi-
ness development companies" in 15 U.S.C. § 80-2(a)(48) (1988)).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(d), 23(a).
57. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(b).
58. The 1940 Act divides investment companies into closed-end and open-end companies for
regulatory purposes. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-5(a). Open-end companies are mutual funds whose investors
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pro rata value of their portfolio securities.5 9 The bar against issuing new
equity at prices below net asset value, then, would predictably operate as a
bar against new equity offerings by most MSICs most of the time.6 0 Once
again, a rule without serious consequences for passive investment funds
might well cripple an MSIC in search of new opportunities for active
investment.
The 1940 Act's restrictions on new equity capital are exacerbated by
equally draconian limitations on debt financing. Under section 18(a) of the
1940 Act,6 1 an MSIC is prohibited from issuing any senior securities unless
it could pass an asset coverage test of at least 300 percent in the case of debt
securities, and 200 percent in the case of preferred stock. In addition, sec-
tion 18(c) restricts MSICs to a single class of debt securities. 62 As a conse-
quence, an American MSIC would be forced to depend almost entirely on its
initial equity offering, rights offerings to existing shareholders, voluntary re-
investment of dividends, and bank loans for new financing. The option of
long-term debt financing, which would permit the MSIC to exploit new in-
vestment opportunities without diluting existing shareholders, would be
largely foreclosed. 63
The 1940 Act would be equally inhospitable if MSIC managers wished to
make periodic redemptions or repurchases to combat the discounts that are
endemic to closed-end investment companies. Section 23(c)6 tightly regu-
lates repurchases of shares by closed-end investment companies. The SEC's
Division of Investment Management recently acknowledged that the most
effective method of repurchase-periodic tender offers-is particularly cum-
bersome for closed-end investment companies.6 5 But tender offers are costly
even outside the highly regulated world of investment companies. The inter-
actions between the 1940 Act and tender offer regulation would make tender
may redeem their interests at net asset value. By contrast, closed-end companies, like ordinary cor-
porations, issue shares that may be traded but not redeemed.
59. Such discounts are not only well documented for American closed-end investment compa-
nies, but appear to affect Swedish MSICs as well. See KINNEVIK, supra note 34, at 6; see also notes
86 & 89 infra and accompanying text.
60. Indeed, § 23(b) has precisely this effect today, barring new equity offerings by diversified
closed-end investment companies. See 2 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURI-
TIES REGULATION § 17.5 (2d ed. 1990). The limited exception consists of rights offerings by the
small number of funds trading at a premium to their net asset value. In these offerings, existing
shareholders get the opportunity to purchase new shares at a discount to net asset value. See Wil-
liam Power, Gabelli Asks Investors for More, Again, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 1992, at Cl.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(a)(l)(A), 2(A).
62. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-18(c). The 1940 Act provides some flexibility insofar as bank loans and
other privately-negotiated debt are not deemed "securities" for purposes of the single issue rule,
though they must be included in asset coverage calculations. Id.
63. The Swedish experience demonstrates the importance of this barrier to debt financing.
During the period 1978-1988, Swedish MSICs issued essentially no new stock, financing the increase
in their holdings with borrowings. Skog & Isaksson, supra note 30, at 8.
64. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(c).
65. DIVISION OF INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT, SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,
PROTECTING INVESTORS: A HALF-CENTURY OF INVESTMENT COMPANY REGULATION 440-41,
reprinted in Extra Edition No. 1504, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) (May 29, 1992).
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offers still more costly for MSICs. 66
As a final illustration of the regulatory barriers to an American MSIC,
consider the broad and ambiguous conflict-of-interest rules imposed on in-
vestment companies by the 1940 Act. To deter self-dealing by investment
company insiders, the 1940 Act bars purchases and sales of securities be-
tween an investment company and its promoter, underwriter, affiliates, or
affiliates of its affiliates-subject to a lengthy determination by the SEC that
the proposed transaction would be "fair" to the shareholders of all compa-
nies involved.67 Under the 1940 Act, the affiliates of an investment company
include not only its directors, employees, controlling person, and holders of
more than 5 percent of its voting equity (or "upstream affiliates"), but also
portfolio companies in which the investment company holds more than 5
percent of voting equity (or "downstream affiliates"). 68 For good measure,
Rule 17d-1, promulgated under the 1940 Act, also bars joint arrangements
or enterprises between investment companies and affiliated persons that are
undertaken without prior SEC authorization.69 Uncertainty remains regard-
ing the precise reach of these conflict-of-interest prohibitions, however, be-
cause more recent exemptive rules narrow their scope in complex ways.70
If the protection of the Commission's exemptive provisions were with-
held, the 1940 Act's conflict-of-interest rules would cut especially deeply
against a prospective American MSIC. Virtually any exchange of shares be-
tween an MSIC and one of its portfolio companies, or an affiliate of either
firm, would require advance authorization by the SEC. Thus, any buyout,
issuer repurchase, or share conversion-in addition to a simple effort by an
MSIC to provide a needy portfolio company with additional capital-would
be subject to regulatory veto and lengthy delays. Strategic investments by an
MSIC portfolio company, such as the acquisition of a rival firm, would risk
running afoul of the proscription against joint enterprises between the MSIC
and its affiliates. Indeed, even placing MSIC directors on the boards of port-
folio companies-the core feature of the MSIC strategy-might constitute a
joint arrangement requiring SEC authorization, and, at the very least, would
greatly increase the risk that major investment decisions by the portfolio
company would do so. 71
66. Note, however, that the costs of employing periodic tender offers to make repurchases,
while still substantial, have been reduced within the last year. A recent SEC release reversed the
Commission's long-standing view that any program of periodic tender offers poses serious fiduciary
problems for investment company directors. Investment Company Act Release No. 19115, app. C
[1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,063 (Nov. 20, 1992); cf DIVISION OF INVEST-
MENT MANAGEMENT, supra note 65, at 443 n.88 (criticizing the SEC's prior opposition to tender
offers). In addition, the newly proposed rules would, if adopted, further facilitate periodic repur-
chases by closed-end funds. See Investment Company Act Release No. 18869, [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 85,022 (July 28, 1992).
67. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-17(a)(1), (a)(2), (b)(1).
68. 15 U.S.C. § 80-2(a)(3); see also HAZEN, supra note 60, § 17.7; The Application of Section 17
of the Investment Company Act of 1940 to Portfolio Affiliates, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 983, 985-86 (1972).
69. Rule 17d-l(a), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(a) (1992).
70. See Rule 17a-6, 17 C.F.R. § 270.17a-6 (1992); Rule 17d-l(d)(5), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-
l(d)(5) (1992).
71. Rule 17d-l(a) bars an affiliate of an investment company from "participat[ing] in, or ef-
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Due to these onerous requirements for advance authorization and fair-
ness review, the MSIC form would not likely survive if the 1940 Act's trans-
actional and joint enterprise restrictions applied to transactions between
MSICs and portfolio companies. The issue thus becomes whether the SEC's
overlay of exemptive provisions might remove MSICs from the authoriza-
tion requirement. At first glance, the exemptive rules (specifically Rules
17a-6 and 17d-l(d)) appear promising because they are targeted at insulating
the "downstream relationship" between investment companies and portfolio
affiliates from regulatory interference. On closer inspection, however, it be-
comes apparent that great uncertainty remains as to the reach of these ex-
emptions: in particular, any attempt to compensate MSIC officers on the
basis of portfolio company performance would seem to jeopardize the availa-
bility of the exemptions.72 Thus, the 1940 Act's harsh conflict-of-interest
rules, and the ambiguity surrounding the ameliorative provisions that pur-
port to weaken these rules, comprise a formidable, if not fatal, obstacle to the
MSIC form.73
fect[ing] any transaction in connection with, any joint enterprise or other joint arrangement or
profit-sharing plan" in which the investment company is also a "participant," without first obtaining
SEC authorization. 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(a). This notoriously ambiguous language is usually con-
strued to refer to transactions with third parties in which both the investment company and its
affiliated portfolio company participate. See, eg., Milton P. Kroll, The "Portfolio Affliate" Problem,
in 3 ANNUAL INSTrTrrE ON SECURrEs REGULATION 261, 283-86 (Robert H. Mundheim & Ar-
thur Fleisher, Jr. eds., 1972). However, any construction of the rule would be possible in the unprec-
edented circumstance in which an MSIC's employees participated as directors in the business
decisions of a portfolio affiliate. More particularly, the portfolio affiliate--or any of its major trans-
actions with third parties-might be deemed to be a "joint enterprise." Alternatively, the compensa-
tion arrangements between the affiliate and its MSIC directors might be so characterized. The
flexible language of the Rule imposes very few limitations on SEC intervention.
72. For example, Rule 17a-6 exempts from § 17(a) of the 1940 Act a transaction between an
investment company and an affiliated portfolio company, providing, inter alia, that no investment
company insiders (including officers, directors, and promoters) act as parties to the transaction or
have a "direct or indirect financial interest" in a party to the transaction. Rules 17a-6(a)(1) & 17a-
6(a)(5)(ii), 17 C.F.R. §§ 270.17a-6(a)(1), 270.17a-6(a)(5)(ii). Officers of MSICs who receive contin-
gent compensation based on the performance of a portfolio company (and who serve as a director of
a portfolio company) might have a sufficient financial interest in the MSIC or the portfolio company
to cost the MSIC its Rule 17a-6 exemption. Cf Narraganset Capital Corp., Investment Company
Act Release No. 11,018, 1980 WL 29383, at *3 (S.E.C. Jan. 14, 1980) (Rule 17a-6 exemption un-
available to investment company when one director has indirect financial interest as salaried officer
of portfolio company). Similarly, Rule 17d-l(d) amends the joint enterprise rule currently formu-
lated in Rule 17d-l(a) to exempt joint enterprises in which no investment company insider has "a
financial interest, direct or indirect." Rule 17d-l(d)(5)(i), 17 C.F.R. § 270.17d-l(d)(5)(i). Once
again, the question arises: When might the performance-based compensation of an MSIC officer
trigger the financial interest test, and thus foreclose the exemption, in the course of a "joint enter-
prise" between an MSIC and a portfolio affiliate? Cf Narraganset Capital Corp., 1980 WL 29383, at
*4 (Rule 17d-l(d)(5) exemption unavailable to investment company when one director has indirect
financial interest as salaried officer of portfolio company). Indeed, it appears that a contingent com-
pensation arrangement between an MSIC and one of its officers would itself be a "joint transaction"
outside the scope of the Rule's exemptive provision, even apart from a transaction involving a port-
folio affiliate. See R. James Gromley, On the Same Side of the Table: Is Investment Company Act
Rule 17d-1 Partly Invalid?, 20 SEc. REG. L.J. 115, 117-18 (1992).
73. Consider this recent observation regarding Rule 17d-1:
In analyzing the difficulties of "portfolio affiliates" of investment companies under Section
17(d), a lawyer experienced with the Investment Company Act described the section and
rule as "a morass of unascertainable depth," and referred to the SEC's own acknowledge-
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Although this sampling of the regulatory barriers raised by the 1940 Act
is hardly exhaustive,74 it demonstrates that the 1940 Act itself can explain
the absence of American MSICs. 75 As additional evidence, consider the
three classes of American firms that come closest to pursuing an MSIC in-
vestment strategy. First, private investment companies make MSIC-like in-
vestments in public corporations.76 But the 1940 Act bars such firms from
the public capital markets, so they remain closed to all but a handful of
wealthy investors. Second, business development corporations (or "BDCs")
are permitted to raise public funds for active MSIC-like investments in start-
up corporations.77 But BDCs are restricted to venture capital opportunities,
and have flourished only since 1980, when Congress expressly exempted
them from the most onerous provisions of the 1940 Act.78 Finally, Warren
Buffett's famous investment vehicle, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., is the closest
existing approximation of a publicly-traded American MSIC. But Berkshire
Hathaway escapes the 1940 Act only by folding its strategic investment ac-
tivities into an insurance subsidiary, and exploiting Nebraska's permissive
insurance statute in a fashion that no other company can be expected to
duplicate. 79
ment of "the uncertain standards under 17(d)." His ultimate legal advice was "prayer
consistently applied"!
Gromley, supra note 72, at 116-17 (citations omitted). Prayer may suffice to resolve the legal
problems of conventional investment companies, but it is hardly a secure foundation for launching a
new investment form such as the MSIC.
74. See Letter from Jan Stenbeck to Jonathan G. Katz, supra note 35. One especially serious
additional obstacle to an American MSIC is the 1940 Act's ban on circular ownership. This ban
would force an MSIC to divest its shares in a portfolio affiliate within a year after a portfolio com-
pany purchased more than 3% of the MSIC's shares. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-20(c), (d). The management
of any portfolio affiliate would be able to sever its ties to an MSIC at will, merely by buying a small
block of the MSIC's shares. The threat of forced divestment would deter an MSIC from attempting
to discipline the management of a portfolio company, no matter how poor the management's
performance.
75. A final type of barrier presents more risk to Swedish than to American MSICs. A few
states have adopted antitakeover statutes that obligate a shareholder whose ownership exceeds a
specified ceiling, always less than a majority, to make an offer to purchase all the remaining shares at
a formula price. See, eg., 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 2541-2548 (1992). While the goal of such
statutes was to discourage creeping takeovers, their effect is to bar an MSIC-type ownership struc-
ture in companies subject to the restriction. While an American MSIC could avoid such statutes by
not investing in companies incorporated in the small number of jurisdictions in which they have been
adopted, existing Swedish MSICs face a much more serious threat. The European Commission's
Proposed Thirteenth Directive contains such a mandatory bid requirement that triggers upon acqui-
sition of not more than one-third of the voting rights in a company. See Amended Proposal for a
Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeovers and Other General Bids, art.
4, 1991 O.J. (L 240) 4-5. If the directive is adopted, Swedish MSICs face a serious problem should
Sweden join the European Community.
76. See, eg., Smith & White, supra note 53, at Cl.
77. See note 55 supra.
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-2(a)(48), 80a-54.
79. See Roe, supra note 2, at 23 n.53 (describing the unique legal structure of Berkshire
Hathaway). The 1940 Act exempts insurance companies from its provisions. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-
3(c)(3).
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IV. OBJECTIONS TO AMERICAN MSICs
Even if the current provisions of the 1940 Act effectively bar American
MSICs, it does not necessarily follow that MSICs would thrive in the ab-
sence of the 1940 Act, or indeed, that they should be permitted to thrive.
Three possible objections to MSICs remain, notwithstanding the MSIC's
promise as a device for mitigating the governance costs of American corpo-
rations. First, the American regulatory scheme reflects a deep-seated con-
cern that active financial investors, like MSICs, might somehow injure the
interests of other passive public investors. Second, the perennial problem of
discounts on closed-end investment companies creates an attendant concern
that whatever value MSICs might add to their portfolio companies would be
lost to MSIC shareholders and other public shareholders of portfolio compa-
nies. Finally, the fqindamental question remains whether MSICs, as large-
block shareholders, Iaight fail to add real value to their portfolio companies.
A. Non-MSIC Shareholders of Portfolio Companies
Concern about the risks posed to public investors by active financial in-
vestors has been a deep-seated and recurrent theme in the politics of Ameri-
can regulation, including the regulation of investment companies.80 What
distinguishes investment companies in general (and MSICs in particular)
from other financial institutions is that they are pure equity investors. They
fit perfectly within the one-dimensional American governance pattern, be-
cause their sole interest is in investment returns and their sole relationship to
their portfolio companies is that of a shareholder/principal. Thus, MSIC
investments would present few, if any, of the conflicts of interest that would
accompany active investments by other institutional investors, such as com-
mercial banks, pension funds, or insurance companies.81 It follows that
MSICs should escape much of the traditional antipathy toward active finan-
cial investors, here based on a fear of conflicts of interest that might harm
other shareholders. Moreover, given the low turnover and long-term nature
of MSIC investments, even fears of second-order conflicts of interest such as
insider trading by MSICs would seem to be misplaced. 82
Far from triggering the usual suspicions about financial investors, the
MSIC would seem to be the model monitor within the one-dimensional
American governance framework. Only foolish uses of MSIC influence
80. For an extensive analysis of the role of this concern in the drafting of the 1940 Act and
subsequent tax legislation, see Roe, supra note 50, at 1471-74, 1484-94.
81. See id. at 1503-04 (presenting potential conflicts of interest facing non-MSIC, nonmutual
fund institutions).
82. Concern about the conflicts of interest inherent in a multidimensional monitoring relation-
ship motivates much of the criticism of the role of universal banks in German corporate governance,
as well as the role of main banks in Japanese governance. See BAUMS, supra note 9, at 25-26; Gilson
& Roe, supra note 12, at 879-82; Kbndgen, supra note 9, at 23-25. One approach to minimizing the
risk of conflict of interest without giving up the advantages of a multidimensional monitoring struc-
ture is to focus on the areas where the conflict of interest is most pronounced. For example, one
might prohibit proxy voting by German banks in the atisence of specific shareholder instruction
when the subject of the election concerns control.
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could harm other shareholders in its portfolio companies, for example, need-
less interference with sound management decisions. Yet, such misguided ac-
tivism would be powerfully deterred because it would soon put the MSIC
itself out of business. Moreover, precisely because the MSIC would be a
minority shareholder, and would thus exercise only influence not outright
control, the MSIC might not have sufficient influence itself to be able to
trump the business decisions of a successful management team.83
B. The Problem of Discounts
A more subtle problem is the risk that MSICs might fail to reward their
own shareholders, as a consequence of the perennial market discounts that
dog closed-end investment companies. Shares in closed-end investment
companies commonly trade at a discount to net asset value for reasons that
continue to elude financial economists, but appear to be unrelated to the
quality of company management.84 Although such discounts now average
between 1 and 10 percent of net asset value, they have reached 20 percent
and higher in previous five year periods. 85 The Swedish experience provides
good reason to expect the discount phenomenon to affect American MSICs
at least as much as it currently affects diversified closed-end investment com-
panies.86 Indeed, to the extent that American MSICs fail to qualify for the
same pass-through tax treatment that diversified investment companies en-joy,8 7 MSIC discounts might even be larger than existing discounts on
closed-end funds. It is fair to ask, then, whether such discounts might make
American MSICs unattractive investments, even without the regulatory bar-
riers imposed by the 1940 Act. Or, to put the question differently: Would
shareholders refuse to invest in MSICs if they could avoid the MSIC dis-
count by investing directly in the MSIC's portfolio corporations?
Both questions may be answered negatively, provided that the value ad-
ded by the MSIC to its portfolio companies exceeds the discount on the
shares of the MSIC. Consider the life cycle of a successful MSIC that is
capable of augmenting the value of its portfolio of active investments by, say,
83. See note 43 supra.
84. See Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted"
Share Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 902-05 (1988) (surveying finance
literature on explanations for closed-end fund discounts); Kathleen Weiss, Kenneth Lehn & David
Malmquist, Office of Economic Analysis, Securities and Exchange Commission, The Post-Offering
Price Performance of Closed-End Funds (July 21, 1989) (unpublished manuscript, on file with Stan-
ford Law Review). A novel recent effort to explain discounts relies on noise trading by small inves-
tors and the attendant market risk that small investors introduce into the pricing of dosed-end fund
securities. See J. Bradford De Long & Andrei Shleifer, Closed-End Fund Discounts: A Yardstick of
Small investor Sentiment, J. PORTFOLIO MGMT., Winter 1992, at 46. Persistent discounts are pres-
ently a major concern of SEC investment company regulation. See DIVISION OF INVESTMENT
MANAGEMENT, supra note 65, at 432-42.
85. See Kraakman, supra note 84, at 903.
86. For example, prior to 1989, shares in the Swedish MSIC Kinnevik had been historically
priced at between 60% and 80% of net asset value. KINNEVIK, supra note 34, at 97. Notwithstand-
ing this heavy discount, Kinnevik significantly outperformed the Swedish market during the 1980s
as a consequence of the rapidly increasing value of its portfolio. Id. at 4-5.
87. See note 50 supra.
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50 percent over a ten year holding period, but is subject to an average mar-
ket discount of 10 percent. If the MSIC is capitalized with an initial public
offering, its original shareholders will predictably suffer a 10 percent market
loss-the MSIC's market discount-relative to the market value of the eq-
uity stakes that the MSIC purchases for its portfolio.88 However, as the
value of the monitoring services that the.MSIC provides becomes apparent
in the improved performance of its portfolio companies, the prices of shares
in these companies will rise until they fully reflect the value of the MSIC's
contribution. By hypothesis, the MSIC's shares will always trade at a price
that averages 10 percent less than the pro rata value of its portfolio. Yet, an
original investor in the MSIC who holds her shares long enough for the
market to recognize the improved performance of the MSIC portfolio will
realize a 40 percent gain. It is highly unlikely this same investor could have
reaped the full 50 percent gain merely by mimicking the MSIC's investment
choices for the simple reason that, immediately upon announcement of the
MSIC's investment decisions, the share prices of its portfolio companies
should already reflect much of the prospective value of the MSIC's monitor-
ing contributions.
It follows that the likelihood of discounts alone need not make an Ameri-
can MSIC unattractive to investors. Some Swedish MSICs have performed
extremely well in the face of continuous large discounts.8 9 At most, an ex-
pected discount establishes a floor for the value that the MSIC must add to
its portfolio companies in order to remain a profitable venture for public
investors.
C. Can MSICs Add Sufficient Value in the American Market?
Given that American MSICs could succeed if they were able to add suffi-
cient value to their portfolio companies, the final issue is whether MSICs can
be expected to realize important monitoring gains. Here, there can be no
guarantees. Nevertheless, both anecdotal and systematic evidence suggest
that, with competent management, publicly-held MSICs would enjoy a rea-
sonable chance of generating the requisite gains. The anecdotal evidence
includes the proven track record of Berkshire Hathaway9" and the continu-
ing efforts of privately-held investment companies to pursue MSIC-like in-
vestment strategies beyond the reach of the 1940 Act. While data on the
performance of private MSICs is unavailable, such companies do appear to
enjoy the confidence of sophisticated investors in the American market.91
The systematic evidence favoring the MSIC strategy is the same evidence
88. See Weiss, Lehn & Malmquist, supra note 84, at 4 (reporting an average 15% discount
within 120 days of initial public offerings of closed-end equity funds).
89. See, e.g., KINNEVIK, supra note 34, at 6.
90. See BERKSHIRE HATHAWAY INC., 1991 ANNUAL REPORT 4, 32 (1991).
91. See, e.g., Smith & White, supra note 53, at C1 (Allied Investment Partners L.P. to "buy
friendly stakes of 5% to 20% in about a dozen public companies with subpar records" and present
four "industrialists" to serve as expert directors on portfolio company boards). But cf note 99 infra
(Corporate Partners, another "white squire" fund, has experienced mixed investment results).
1006 [Vol. 45:985
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
that supports the case for institutional monitoring in general. Bernard Black
aptly characterizes it as "modest, but not conclusive," 92 as it must be, given
the paucity of systematic efforts to introduce monitoring reforms of any sort.
Following Black's typology, the most salient evidence from the American
market falls into three categories: (1) studies investigating the link between
corporate value and concentrated ownership; (2) the analogy to leveraged
buyouts; and (3) data on the effects of institutional monitoring.
The evidence on the effects of concentrated ownership on corporate per-
formance is difficult to interpret, because none of the commonly used proxies
for evaluating performance is entirely satisfactory. Nevertheless, the overall
pattern of results from the concentration studies points in the right direction.
Studies of Tobin's q-the ratio of the replacement value of a company's as-
sets to the market value of its equity-generally show a positive correlation
between Tobin's q (interpreted as a proxy for performance) and the size of
ownership blocks held by corporate insiders, for ownership blocks ranging
from 0 to 5 percent. 93 For blocks between 5 and 20 percent, the relationship
between Tobin's q and increasing ownership is less clear, although most
studies find that greater ownership is associated with improved performance
when insider holdings approach 20 to 25 percent of a company's voting eq-
uity, the average stake that an MSIC would likely hold in a portfolio com-
pany.94 In addition, studies of other proxies for corporate performance,
such as earnings to price ratios and accounting profits, often find a positive
relationship to ownership concentration, despite some mixed results.95
Taken together, the ownership studies suggest a mildly positive relation-
ship between active large-block shareholders and corporate performance.
This result hardly guarantees the success of the MSIC strategy. Neverthe-
less, any favorable relationship between ownership and corporate perform-
ance is encouraging, given our imperfect measures of performance, and more
importantly, the likely differences between MSICs and other large-block
holders. Where today's typical inside blockholder is usually a company
founder, his scion, or another operating company that may also have trade
links to the portfolio company, MSICs would invest selectively in companies
92. Bernard S. Black, The Value of Institutional Investor Monitoring: The Empirical Evidence,
39 UCLA L. REv. 895, 917 (1992).
93. Id. at 918 & nn.97-98 (citing studies on Tobin's q).
94. Thus, Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny report a positive correlation
between Tobin's q and holdings in the 0% to 5% range and beyond the 25% level, with a slight
negative correlation between 5% and 25%. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny,
Management Ownership and Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293, 311-13
(1988). Hermalin and Weisbach report a significant positive correlation between Tobin's q and the
size of CEO holdings in the 5% to 25% range. Hermalin & Weisbach, The Effect of Board Composi-
tion and Direct Incentives on Corporate Performance, J. FIN. (forthcoming 1992). John McConnell
and Henri Servaes report a similar relationship between Tobin's q and the joint effects of insider
holdings, large outsider holdings, and institutional holdings (but not insider holdings alone) over the
5% to 25% range. John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Additional Evidence on Equity Ownership
and Corporate Value, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 595, 609 (1990); see also Black, supra note 92, at 918 &
nn.97-98 (citing studies on Tobin's q).
95. See Black, supra note 92, at 918-20 & nn.100-111 (citing studies).
April 1993] 1007
1008 STANFORD LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45:985
with the most to gain from expert monitoring.96 In addition, MSICs would
presumably enjoy other important advantages over family blockholders,
such as superior risk-bearing ability and monitoring expertise.
For these reasons, the MSIC strategy might be better evaluated from the
perspective of Bernard Black's analogy to leveraged buyouts (where profes-
sional monitors also choose their companies carefully), than from the per-
spective of a more generalized connection between performance and
ownership structure over all companies. Moreover, the data on leveraged
buyouts are far more encouraging for MSICs. Numerous studies indicate
that the LBOs of the 1980s made significant improvements in corporate per-
formance on a number of dimensions, at least through 1986.97 The parallel
evidence is less impressive for Black's third category of studies on the effects
of monitoring by institutional investors.98 But this is hardly surprising,
given the traditionally weak monitoring role of institutional investors. One
would expect the monitoring intensity of MSICs to fall somewhere between
institutional investors and LBO syndicates. However, between these two
poles, the MSIC would more nearly resemble the LBO syndicate, both in its
96. The differences between an MSIC and existing blockholders as a proxy for MSICs likely
explain the few empirical studies that suggest a negative relation between the presence of
blockholders and portfolio company performance. Michael Barclay, Clifford Holderness, and Jef-
frey Pontiff examine a peculiar subset of blockholders-those holding large minority positions in
diversified closed-end investment companies. They report that cross-sectional discounts from net
asset value appear to be significantly larger for funds with a large blockholder than for funds without
such a holder. Michael J. Barclay, Clifford G. Holderness & Jeffrey Pontiff, Private Benefits from
Block Ownership and Discounts on Closed-End Funds 16-18 (July 1992) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with the Stanford Law Review). The result is interpreted as evidence that blockholders receive
returns unavailable to other shareholders, primarily through the provision of advisory services for
high fees. The larger discounts are then said to result either directly from such wealth transfers or
from the reluctance of large blockholders receiving such transfers to open up or liquidate a dis-
counted investment company. Id. at 17. Even if correct, this interpretation has little relevance to
evaluation of the MSIC form. As the authors note, a selection bias underlies their result: Large
blockholders who wish to improve the performance of a discounted closed-end fund will open-end it
or liquidate it, thereby dropping out of the sample. Id. at 3-5. By contrast, an MSIC improves
performance through ongoing efforts to monitor portfolio company performance. Furthermore, un-
like the closed-end investment fund with a large blockholder as investment advisor, an MSIC has
only a one-dimensional relation to its portfolio companies; the MSIC form does not present the
opportunities for self-dealing reported in connection with advisory fees paid by closed-end invest-
ment companies.
Another empirical study reported that companies with a large block of stock held by another
corporation earned positive returns over the period studied, but lower returns than a control group
without a blockholder. Stuart Rosenstein & David F. Rush, The Stock Return Performance of Cor-
porations That Are Partially Owned By Other Corporations, 13 J. FIN. REs. 39, 50 (1990). The
study's results are difficult to evaluate, because it does not disclose the character of the blockholders.
The results support the conjecture that the average reported may reflect a mix of blockholders who
do monitor and those who, like the closed-end blockholders, engage in self-dealing. A subsample of
companies in which Victor Posner was the blockholder performed substantially worse than the over-
all sample. Id.
97. See, e.g., Steven Kaplan, The Effects of Management Buyouts on Operating Performance
and Value, 24 J. FIN. ECON. 217 (1989); Abbie J. Smith, Corporate Ownership Structure and Per-
formance: The Case of Management Buyouts, 27 J. FIN. ECON. 143 (1990); see also Black, supra note
92, at 924-25 & nn.129-134 (citing studies on the effects of LBOs on corporate performance).
98. Institutional ownership is associated with higher Tobin's q ratios, and there is some evi-
dence that institutional shareholders are more likely to exercise an informed vote than other share-
holders. See Black, supra note 92, at 926-27.
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monitoring capabilities and in its investment incentive to improve corporate
performance.
Stepping back from the data, there are good prospects that the expert
monitoring of a well-managed MSIC could add significant value to at least
some public corporations in the American market. Indeed, a different con-
clusion is almost inconceivable, given the extended theoretical literature on
the agency problem in the Berle-Means corporation, and the equally rich
store of anecdotal evidence on the propensity of managers to place their own
welfare over that of their shareholders. Less certain is whether American
MSICs could generate enough value to overcome the handicap of the market
discounts that they would almost certainly bear. But the risk that American
MSICs might not succeed on this score is hardly an adequate reason to
maintain the proscriptions of the 1940 Act. The rewards of success would
be a significant governance reform in the American market with the poten-
tial to benefit not only investors in MSICs, but also investors in portfolio
companies and in the market more generally. If MSICs failed, the only
losers would be the shareholders of the MSICs. The possibility of losses for
such investors is no different than for any other promising but risky ven-
ture.99 The full disclosure required of public companies by the federal secur-
ities laws would assure that, if American MSICs were permitted, no one
would mistake them for a qualitatively less risky investment such as a diver-
sified passive investment company.
V. CONCLUSION
As with other organizational forms, differing regulatory, institutional,
and political environments create a diversity of corporate governance struc-
tures. Particular structures are neither functional nor dysfunctional in the
abstract; everything depends on the national context in which they must op-
erate. Despite such contingency, however, specific governance structures
can be evaluated against larger national patterns or frameworks of corporate
governance, such as the one-dimensional American pattern of shareholder-
oriented governance. In particular, distinguishing between broader national
patterns of governance and specific governance structures permits a reform-
ist approach to comparative corporate governance. A specific structure that
99. No reason exists to expect every MSIC to succeed over all periods. For example, Corpo-
rate Partners, a recently created "white squire" fund, appears to have suffered a substantial loss on
its holdings in Phar-Mor, Inc. when it was recently discovered that senior Phar-Mor executives
engaged in massive embezzlement and substantially misstated the company's financial condition,
despite the presence of a prominent outside auditor. See George Anders, Phar-Mor Scandal Clouds
Corporate Partners, WALL ST. J., Aug. 6, 1992, at Cl. Even the best monitor (or auditor) will not
always detect willful fraud or illegality, as indicated by the presence of two of the most respected
investor-monitors-Warren Buffett and Charles Munger, chairman and vice chairman of Berkshire
Hathaway-on the board of Salomon, Inc. during its period of illegal conduct and subsequent delay
in reporting. Fortunately, serious fraud committed by senior executives remains an anomaly in
American business, and Corporate Partners' overall annual returns, excluding the Phar-Mor invest-
ment, appear to average approximately 17%. Moreover, the extent to which "white squire" funds or
Berkshire Hathaway actually pursue the active monitoring strategy contemplated for an MSIC is
unclear.
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has evolved in its own regulatory and political environment might well sug-
gest an incremental reform in a foreign environment, providing that the gov-
ernance structure at issue fits the dominant governance pattern of the
putative host environment.
In this article, we have argued that the MSIC is one such governance
structure that can be introduced as an incremental reform in the American
regulatory and political environment. The MSIC follows a European, and
more particularly Swedish, model of investment companies that specialize in
providing long-term monitoring services to the shareholders of publicly-
traded corporations. Consistent with the dominant American pattern of
corporate governance, the MSIC acts as a pure shareholder holding large
minority stakes in a portfolio of public companies. The MSIC provides
monitoring services to its portfolio companies, e.g., through expert directors,
and earns an investment return for doing so by increasing the value of its
equity holdings. Thus, the MSIC serves as a market response to the agency
problem created by the dispersed ownership of equity in the Berle-Means
corporation. Market experimentation with the MSIC strategy in America
has been limited, largely because the Investment Company Act of 1940 effec-
tively prohibits MSICs. We therefore urge that the MSIC be exempted from
the coverage of the 1940 Act, or at least from the Act's most onerous provi-
sions. There is good reason to believe that this Swedish transplant might
thrive in the American market if the regulatory barriers were lowered, and
there is little to lose, from the perspective of the broader American frame-
work of corporate governance, by experimenting with the MSIC form.
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